To err is human – even in tax administration
Nobody gets everything right all the time; not even AI. Not taxpayers, not their advisers, and certainly not SARS. Yet the consequences of mistakes in tax administration can be surprisingly unforgiving.
A simple error in a tax return may lead to an incorrect assessment, unexpected tax liabilities, interest and even understatement penalties. Equally, an error by SARS can leave a taxpayer facing months, sometimes years, of unnecessary costly disputes.
Fortunately, the Tax Administration Act (TA Act) recognises that mistakes happen. Two provisions are particularly relevant: one allows incorrect assessments to be corrected, whilst the other provides relief from understatement penalties in certain circumstances.
SARS' recently published Interpretation Note 147, of 11 November 2026, provides a useful opportunity to consider how these provisions should operate in practice.
When a mistake is simply a mistake
Section 93(1)(d) allows SARS to reduce an assessment where it is satisfied that there is a ‘readily apparent undisputed error’, whether made by SARS in an assessment or by the taxpayer in a return.
The purpose is sensible. Where an obvious mistake has occurred, why should taxpayers be forced into lengthy and expensive objection and appeal proceedings simply to have it corrected?
Interpretation Note 147 confirms that the error may involve either an incorrect inclusion or an omission. Importantly, it also recognises that mistakes originating in the accounting records used to prepare a tax return may qualify.
Consider a company that inadvertently omits a legitimate business expense from its income tax return. If the omission can be established through a straightforward verification of supporting documents, and the other statutory requirements are satisfied, SARS is obliged to reduce the assessment without requiring a formal objection.
However, the remedy has limitations.
The error must be readily identifiable, verifiable and undisputed. If its existence or amount requires extensive investigation, the examination of voluminous documentation or the resolution of complicated legal questions, an objection process may be necessary.
This distinction is understandable. Section 93(1)(d) was never intended to provide a backdoor appeal mechanism for taxpayers who missed their objection deadlines.
But there is something particularly interesting in SARS' interpretation of the word ‘may’.
Referring to the judgment in Rampersadh v CSARS, the Interpretation Note acknowledges that SARS is obliged to reduce an assessment once it is satisfied that the statutory requirements have been met.
In other words, the provision is not an invitation to exercise an arbitrary discretion. Where the requirements are satisfied, correcting the mistake is a duty, not a favour.
Being wrong does not necessarily mean being culpable
This brings us to another important provision.
Section 223(3)(a) now requires SARS to remit a penalty imposed for a substantial understatement where the understatement resulted from a ‘bona fide inadvertent error’.
The distinction is important. Unlike section 93(1)(d), which concerns correcting assessments, section 223(3)(a) deals with relief from penalties. Furthermore, the amended provision is confined to substantial understatements, rather than providing a general defence against all understatement penalties.
Nevertheless, the underlying principle remains relevant: being wrong does not necessarily mean that a taxpayer has behaved culpably.
As discussed in my earlier article, Good Tax Advice Can Save You from Understatement Penalties, the judgments in Thistle Trust, Coronation and IT 76725 demonstrate that obtaining tax advice does not guarantee that SARS or the courts will agree with the advice. The taxpayer may still have to pay the tax. But there is an important difference between being wrong and behaving culpably.
The courts recognised that obtaining competent professional advice, disclosing the relevant facts and genuinely relying on that advice are important considerations when determining whether an error was made in good faith.
The mere existence of an error does not automatically establish liability for a penalty, nor does good faith necessarily provide a universal defence.
Two provisions, one underlying principle
Although sections 93(1)(d) and 223(3)(a) operate differently, they reflect a common recognition: an error is not necessarily evidence of wrongdoing.
The first provision recognises that an assessment should not remain incorrect merely because someone made an obvious mistake. The second provides relief from a substantial understatement penalty where the statutory requirements for remission are satisfied.
Neither provision gives taxpayers unlimited protection. An error requiring extensive investigation may fall outside section 93(1)(d), whilst the remission provisions must be applied within the limits of the legislation.
But both provisions require a proper examination of the circumstances rather than a mechanical response.
And this is where the human factor becomes important.
Taxpayers sometimes fail to disclose relevant information, neglect their obligations or adopt positions that cannot reasonably be defended. SARS officials, on the other hand, may be equally susceptible to human error, whether through misunderstanding the facts, overlooking relevant information or adopting an unnecessarily rigid interpretation of the legislation.
Interpretation Note 147 itself acknowledges that SARS' decisions must be reasonable and that taxpayers are entitled to adequate reasons when requests for reduced assessments are refused.
That recognition is welcome.
Fairness must work both ways
The TA Act is designed not merely to collect revenue, but to administer the tax system lawfully, efficiently and fairly.
Taxpayers have an obligation to comply with the law, disclose relevant information and correct mistakes when they are discovered. SARS has a corresponding obligation to exercise its powers reasonably, consider the facts objectively and recognise when an error warrants correction rather than confrontation.
Ultimately, legislation can provide the necessary safeguards, but it is people who must apply them.
And perhaps that is the real lesson from Interpretation Note 147: tax administration should distinguish between mistakes that need correcting, conduct that deserves sanction and genuine disputes that require resolution.
Getting that distinction right would save taxpayers and SARS considerable time, money and frustration.
After all, to err is human. The challenge is ensuring that our tax administration system responds fairly, without compromising the law.
